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I
Background
As water development concerns increasingly make way forwater resource management strategies, discussions onwater institutions in India and her south Asian neighbours
are focusing on three key issues: (a) how to improve the per-
formance and financial viability of public irrigation systems;
(b) how to make groundwater use sustainable in economic and
environmental terms; and (c) how to make a systematic transition
from the water resource development mode to an Integrated Water
Resources Management (IWRM) mode.
India is struggling on all three fronts. Its public irrigation
systems are falling far short of their design potential for perfor-
mance; they do not receive the investment they need for main-
tenance and upkeep; but above all, they are increasingly becoming
a drag on state exchequer. Indian discussion on public irrigation
systems is enamored by participatory irrigation management
(PIM) and irrigation management transfer (IMT) as an ‘institu-
tional fix’ for all these problems. However, despite two decades
of experimentation, available evidence provides no indication
that PIM works or will solve the problems public irrigation
systems face. Similarly, India is stymied by its unregulated
groundwater economy that functions as a colossal anarchy.
Technocrats advocate strong regulatory frameworks; sociologists
argue for community based resource management; western experts
argue for hi-tech approaches tested in the western US and
Australia’s Murray-Darling. In reality, policy action is paralysed
by a political economy in which half of the country’s population
depends for livelihood on groundwater draft that is rapidly
becoming unsustainable. Worse, thanks to perverse subsidies
under its flat system of electricity pricing, India’s booming
groundwater irrigation economy has wrecked its energy economy.
The key challenges to rationalising electricity pricing and supply
to pumps are the huge transaction costs of collecting charges
based on metered use and the fact that so many livelihoods have
come to depend upon tube well irrigation [Shah, Scott, Kishore
and Sharma 2004]. Much the same reasons defy the transition
to IWRM: how to price water to reflect its scarcity value when
water is such a volatile political issue? How to make an effective
regulatory framework stick? How to unify fragmented water
institutions? [Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel 2001].
While India can provide its own answers to these questions,
experiences from elsewhere may help guide its choices. However,
as suggested above, looking to countries with far different social
realities may not be the most helpful approach. Instead, exam-
ining the experience of nations which share at least some of
India’s fundamental conditions may be the more fruitful. Of those
conditions, the most important may be (1) developing country
status, (2) having a perceived need for water sector reform, and
(3) large numbers of diffuse water users. India’s neighbour to the
north, China, has all three conditions. To gain an understanding
of how the Chinese water experience might provide lessons for
India, we combined literature review with two field visits in the
Chinese provinces of Hebei, Henan, Shaanxi, Liaoning and
Jiangsu during 2002 and 2003 which included visits to around 25
villages and discussions with officials of some 20 water bureaus
at township, county, prefecture and provincial levels. The paper
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outlines a variety of ways in which China has acted differently
from India, indeed all of south Asia, even as it struggles with
the same set of issues that countries like India face. South Asian
discussion and action on irrigation management reforms, ground-
water management and IWRM seems stuck. The idea behind this
paper is not to make a virtue out of the different route that China
is following but to stimulate some ‘out of box’ thinking within
India on possible ways out of its water woes.
II
‘Bounded Service Providers’ as Managers
in Small Irrigation Projects
One issue that most developing countries have not resolved
satisfactorily is the management of irrigation systems, small and
large. For long, governments have maintained large irrigation
bureaucracies. However, bureaucratic management has been seen
as a resounding failure almost everywhere; moreover, resource-
strapped governments increasingly find irrigation bureaucracies
a huge financial burden they are impatient to shed. During 1980s
and 1990s, the idea gained ground that instead of through remote
bureaucracies, irrigation schemes are best managed by organised
and empowered farmer communities [Vermillion 1996 and 1999].
As a result, PIM and irrigation management transfer IMT emerged
as the ‘ideal’ institutional model. And many eager governments
jumped on this new bandwagon with alacrity, especially when
offered a cheap loan from an international donor.
However, after over 20 years of experience with IMT and PIM,
old questions still remain unanswered. Does farmer management
ensure better quality of irrigation service to farmers? Does it mean
lower cost of O and M? Does it result in improved productivity
of irrigation water at the system as well as farm level? And better
spatial and inter-personal equity in the allocation of water? Does
PIM result in greater investment in maintenance and repair? And
ease the financial burden on the state? To none of these has PIM or
IMT offered an enduring answer. In the Philippines, initial years
of the National Irrigation Authority (NIA)’s pioneering effort
threw up positive results; but the performance of PIM has now
slipped [Panella 1999]. Where farmer management has improved
cost recovery, it has done so by shrinking the command area
served. In many African countries, PIM has done better where
command areas are populated by white commercial farmers with
large holdings; but has left black smallholder communities worse
off [Shah, van Koppen, Merrey, Lange, Samad 2002]. In Sri
Lanka and Nepal, there are some success stories; but these need
constant propping up. The latest experiment of large-scale PIM in
Andhra Pradesh in India, which has been projected globally as
a model, has already run out of steam even as several other Indian
states have copied Andhra Pradesh’s PIM Act [Reddy 1999].
One would have expected that after decades of Maoist experi-
ments with variations of collective management in rural economy,
Communist China would take to ideas of community irrigation
management with passion and zest. And everywhere we went,
we found remnants of collective management. However, except
where World Bank loans support PIM projects, China has not
fallen for the communitarian model of irrigation organisation.
Instead, one witnessed everywhere variants of a model best
described as ‘bounded service provider’, a private economic
agent incentivised to perform a role assigned to him/her within
a boundary established and defended by the village committee;
hence our use of the phrase ‘bounded service provider’.
 This model is found most commonly with irrigation tube wells.
Before the sweeping agrarian reforms initiated by the Deng
administration after 1978, collectives throughout China were
responsible for making and maintaining tube wells as well as
pumps and distribution systems. With the onset of the household
responsibility system (now defunct) and later reforms, a variety
of institutional arrangements have now come into play in the
Chinese countryside. Where water tables are high and tube
wells and their operation inexpensive – as in parts of Henan
province – village committees still own and maintain bore
holes; but farmers bring their own or shared pumps; and the
irrigation organisation is quite akin to what we find in a south
Asian village.
In deep tube well areas of Hebei, Shaanxi and Shandong
provinces, village irrigation organisation undergoes marked
change. Shallow and middle deep tube wells dominate the ground-
water irrigation here as well. But we also find areas here with
deep tube wells serving larger commands of 600-1,000 mu
(approximately 40-70 ha), whose construction costs are beyond
the reach of most individual farmers.1 In these areas, it is still
common for deep tube wells to be established, funded, and owned
by the village development committee often by using accumu-
lated savings, borrowing or imposing a new tax on farm land.
Increasingly, however, village committees invite private invest-
ments, usually from farmers, to establish and operate tubewells
as irrigation entrepreneurs [Lohmar et al 2002].
Thus the emerging Chinese management model for small-
holder irrigation systems is strikingly different from what we find
in south Asia. Earlier, in the Maoist era, irrigation tube wells
were directly managed by the village collective through salaried
operators, much like public tube wells are still managed by
government corporations in many Indian states. However, in-
creasingly, O and M of these is commonly contracted out to a
‘service providing entrepreneur’ on a kind of franchise model.
A variety of contracting arrangements seem to be in vogue; but
variations were observed in five areas: (a) identification of
‘service providers’; (b) management fee; (c) responsibility of the
contractor; (d) role of the village committee; and (e) impact.
Typically, ‘service providers’ are found from the more entre-
preneurial amongst the village’s farmers, men or women. Only
in one of the villages we visited did the irrigation system manager
come from outside the village. In a few villages, a five-year
‘management contract’ was auctioned to the highest bidder. But
a common procedure to identify and appoint the ‘service pro-
vider’ was informal negotiation by the village committee (VC)
and/or the township water bureau (TWB) with prospective
candidates. In some Shaanxi villages, where the TWB had built
costly drip or sprinkler irrigation systems, we found the village
leaders themselves, all men, had secured management contracts.
We also came across women managers of tube wells, one of whom
took on the task not because it was remunerative but rather
because she had been pressured by VC relatives to ensure continued
operation. Where the management contract was auctioned, the
village committees levied an annual fee on the contractors;
however, this did not appear to be common and in these cases,
the village committee still assumed the responsibility for main-
tenance and repair, and the manager was responsible only for
water distribution and fee collection.
The period of the management contract varies from five to 30
years. The contractor’s responsibility typically includes:
(a) operation and maintenance of the system; (b) orderly distri-
bution of water to farmers; (c) collection of irrigation fees; and
(d) the payment of electricity fees to the village electrician or
township electricity bureau. However, the irrigation fee is in-
variably determined by the village committee and/or the township
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water bureau; and this feature makes this arrangement different
from outright privatisation. There were too many variations in
the way VCs determined irrigation fees to permit generalisation;
but fees are fixed in terms of hours of pumping or kWh of
electricity used.2 In new drip or sprinkler irrigation systems in
Shaanxi, irrigation fees appeared high and the management
contract lucrative. However, in some villages, we also found that
pressure from farmers forced the VCs to keep irrigation fees low;
and at least in one village, we found the contractor had terminated
his contract and the village committee found a new contractor
who also happened to be the village electrician.
Our surmise is that the lucrativeness of the irrigation franchise
varied with contractor’s contribution to the capital cost. In systems
built, owned and operated by private farmers, the VC had little
or no say in determining the irrigation fee. In some of the new
drip and sprinkler systems, where contractors shared the capital
costs, the VC had the power to fix the irrigation fee, but it allowed
liberal margins and gave long-term contracts. We came across
two such situations in Shaanxi; in one, the contractor shared less
than 10 per cent of the capital cost and received a five-year
contract; but in the other, the contractor contributed 25 per cent
of the capital cost of a sprinkler irrigation system for which he
obtained a 30-year management contract. Management contracts
seemed to be the least lucrative on schemes wholly built and
owned by VCs.
III
Entrepreneurial Managers in Large Irrigation
Systems
When it comes to large irrigation systems, the picture is somewhat
different and more diffuse. There are World Bank assisted PIM
programmes like we have in Andhra Pradesh; but little is known
about how well these have done. Jiangsu has one such project
to organise water user associations (WUAs); however, discus-
sions with the provincial water bureau officials suggested that
the project has not brought about much change. A key problem
Jiangsu wanted addressed by PIM was the control of excessive
use (around 15,000 m3/ha for rice) by farmers of expensive
Yangtze water transferred from the south of the province to north.
In the Jiangsu PIM project, the Bank funds were used to install
meters at each WUA so that farmers could save in water fees
if they reduced water use. Maintaining the meter, distributing
water and collecting the water fee and turning it over to the local
water bureau was all that the WUA did. The maintenance of canals
and other infrastructure is still the responsibility of the local
government.
Elsewhere, canal O and M, water distribution, and water fee
collection in large irrigation systems are increasingly being taken
away from village committees (or collectives) which had domi-
nated irrigation management. This role is increasingly contracted
out by the village leadership to private franchisees or WUAs of
varied hue, often with strong financial incentives to save water
and promote its efficient use. In a study of 51 villages from four
irrigation districts in Ningxia and Henan, Wang et al (2002) found
that between 1995 and 2001, the proportion of villages where
collective management of irrigation systems fell from 100 to 27
per cent; that amongst the villages that moved away from col-
lective management, contracting to individual managers was
twice as popular as forming WUAs; and that many WUAs were
effective guise for management by the village leader himself.3
Canal irrigation fees in many Chinese systems are levied in
two parts: a basic water fee based on area irrigated and a
volumetric water fee based on volume of water use. A part of
the basic water fee collected is the contractor’s fixed reward.
However, the volumetric water fee offers the contractor oppor-
tunity to increase his income by saving water. Before each
cropping season, Irrigation district officials determine a target
water entitlement for each village based on historical use patterns
and other critieria, and value these entitlement on a volumetric
fee. The total cost is apportioned to the farm land in the village,
and the contractor is authorised to collect the volumetric charge
as an enhanced basic water fee from the farmers. However, he
is required to pay to the water bureau only the volumetric rate
on actual water use. By saving water, thus, the contractor can
enhance his earnings. The Wang et al paper (2003) showed that
in the incentivised villages, water managers behaved significantly
differently from the rest of the villages. In general they found
that: (a) in villages with collectively managed systems, water use/
ha was higher; (b) water use/ha was 40 per cent lower in villages
with incentivised management; (c) shift to private contractor
reduces water use/ha but more so when the contractor is
incentivised; (d) water-saving by incentivised managers reduces
wheat yields by 10 per cent, but maize and rice yields were not
affected in any significant manner; and (e) in any case, these
farmers either sustained their income levels or improved them
despite low yields.
The China study by Wang et al, also found that while man-
agement reforms had gathered pace in Ningxia, they stagnated
in Henan. Their explanation was the drive for reform at the
provincial level: in Ningxia, the Provincial Water Bureau pushed
contracting energetically; in Henan, no such initiative was forth-
coming. A study of reform of public tube well management in
Gujarat, India by Mukherji and Kishore (2003) concluded simi-
larly: here too, management reforms succeeded because they were
energetically supported and pushed by the top-levels of the
irrigation department. Moreover, there is indicative evidence that
incentivised irrigation managers have begun to worry about
farmers turning to groundwater irrigation in the face of poor
quality of surface irrigation service. In a Henan, Lohmar et al
(2002) noted: “In these villages, it is interesting to see how the
increasing use of groundwater has led to competition in the
delivery of the village’s water, forcing the surface system to
improve its water delivery services”.
All in all, the direction in which institutional reforms in ir-
rigation management are heading in China is different from south
Asia where reforms are still shrouded in obscure communitarian
logic. In PIM/IMT projects in India, focus of government, NGOs
and donors is on organising the communities, forming WUAs,
capacity building, empowerment, and creating the right ‘process’.
There is little engagement with the nuts-and-bolts issues of
managerial rewards and incentives, clarifying roles and respon-
sibilities and, above all, getting results in terms of improved
services, better fee collection, and more crop per drop. By
focusing on creating ‘bounded service providers’, China’s re-
forms seem focused on results. Nowhere in the course of our
field visits did we hear farmers or officials waxing eloquent about
empowerment and capacity building. Instead, the institutional
design discussion was centrally about shaping incentives, author-
ity, checks and balances, and contract design and enforcement.
Thus, the features of the ‘Bounded Water Service Provider’
model we frequently encounter for small, self-contained
irrigation schemes in rural China are best described as follows:
(a) by insisting that the manager makes a substantial cash in-
vestment, it is ensured that he brings a serious intent of running
a profitable water business for a long haul; (b) the seemingly
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high gross margin allowed makes it worthwhile for him to do
proper O and M; (c) since the VC/TWB have some role to play
in the issue water withdrawal permits by the county water
bureau, they can, to some extent, ensure the manager’s monopoly;
(d) but at the same time, by insisting that the manager cannot
raise the water price without the approval of the TWB, there is
a built-in check on the exercise of monopoly power; and (e) since
the village community has often no other alternative, a well-run,
even if somewhat expensive, irrigation system would lift the
entire economy to a higher plain of welfare.
IV
Energy-Irrigation Nexus
A major cause of widespread groundwater depletion in India
is perverse incentives created by energy subsidies [Shah, Scott,
Kishore and Sharma 2004]. These mean that the cost of ground-
water use that farmers incur does not rise directly with growing
scarcity of groundwater because of perverse energy subsidies.
For instance, the cost of a cubic meter of groundwater purchased
by a small farmer is around Rs 4-5 in eastern Uttar Pradesh or
north Bihar in India where it is abundantly available;4 but it is
less than Rs 2 in north Gujarat where it is mined from 800 feet
or more. In Bangladesh, where groundwater is abundant and can
be pumped from 10 feet below ground, irrigating a hectare of
paddy with purchased groundwater costs a high Taka 6,000
(Approx Rs 4,800; US $ 100) [Mainuddin 2002, pers comm]
which drives many smallholders to manual irrigation; in con-
trast, in groundwater-stressed Tamil Nadu, where most ground-
water presently being used is mined, irrigating a hectare of paddy
with purchased groundwater costs less than Rs 1,500 because
of electricity subsidies. This is not the case in China; as figure
shows for nine villages of Henan and Hebei provinces we surveyed
in 2002, irrigation cost as proportion of gross value of output
rises in tandem with the depth from which groundwater is pumped.
The root of the problems is argued to be the transaction costs
involved in collecting electricity charges from millions of farmers
scattered over a huge country side. The logistical difficulty and
economic costs of metering electricity used by tube wells has
been found so high that most Indian states have done away with
metering and instead charge a flat tariff based on horsepower
rating of the pumps [Shah 1993; Kishore, Sharma and Scott
2002]. Pakistan too tried flat tariff for nearly a decade before
reverting to metering in 2000. In India, there is growing oppo-
sition to flat tariff in part because it is believed to induce
inefficient use of power and groundwater but in part also because
flat tariff has been used by populist politicians to subsidise tube
well irrigation. Electricity subsidy is thought to be the prime
reason why many state electricity boards in India are on the verge
of bankruptcy. Despite this state of affairs, some observers still
argue that reintroduction of metering may not be a practical idea
in the Indian context unless innovative technologies and/or
institutional arrangements for collecting electricity charges can
be used to reduce the transaction costs of metering and charge
collection [Shah, Scott, Kishore and Sharma 2004; Godbole
2002]. All in all, groundwater as well as power sectors in India
are stuck in an invidious energy-irrigation nexus that does not
augur well for either.
Surprisingly, the electricity-irrigation nexus is not a subject of
discussion in China at all. The Chinese electricity supply industry
operates on two principles (a) of total cost-recovery in generation,
transmission and distribution at each level with some minor cross-
subsidisation across user groups and areas; and (b) each user pays
in proportion to his metered use. Unlike in much of south Asia,
rural electricity throughout China was charged at a higher rate
than urban; and agriculture paid more than domestic and indus-
trial use until a few years ago [Wang et al 2004]. Until 1997,
the responsibility for O and M of the village electricity infra-
structure and user charge recovery lay with the village committee.
The standard arrangement in use was for the village committee
and the township electricity bureau to appoint and train one or
more local farmers as part time village electrician with dual
responsibility, of maintaining the power supply infrastructure in
the village as well as collecting user charges for a transformer
assigned to him/her based on metered individual consumption
from all categories of users. The sum of power use recorded in
the meters attached to all irrigation pumps has to tally with the
power supply recorded at the transformer for any given period.
The electrician is required to pay the township electricity bureau
for power use recorded at the transformer level.
This arrangement did not always work easily. Where power
supply infrastructure was old and worn out, line losses below
the transformer made this difficult. To allow for normal line
losses, 10 per cent allowance is given by the township electricity
bureau to the electrician. However, even this must have made
it difficult for the latter to tally the two; as a result, an Electricity
Network Reform Programme was undertaken by the national
government to modernise and rehabilitate rural power infrastruc-
ture.5 Where this was done, line losses fell sharply;6 and among
the villages we visited, none had a problem tallying power
consumption recorded at the transformer level with the sum of
consumption recorded by individual users, especially with the
line-loss allowance of 10 per cent.
It is interesting that the village electrician in Henan and Hebei
is able to deliver on fairly modest reward of Y 200-250/month
plus incentive bonus of around Y 200/month [Zhang 2004] which
is equivalent to the value of wheat produced on 1 mu (or one-
fifteenth of the value of output on a hectare of land). For this
rather modest wage, China’s village electrician undertakes to
Figure: Irrigation Cost and Pumping Depth of Water Level
in Tube Wells
 Pumping water level —— Irrigation cost/mt of wheat
Nine villages from Henan and Hebei Provinces, north China.
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Table 1: Issues in Agricultural Water-Energy Nexus:
China versus India
 China India
Energy fees  proportional to use Yes No
Cost recovery in energy provision Yes No
Operator incentive for water efficiency and fee collection Yes No
Strong energy management oversight from village authorities Yes No
Water-Energy Nexus is considered an unresolved issue No Yes
make good to the township electricity station full amount on line
and commercial losses in excess of 10 per cent of the power
consumption recorded on the transformers; if he can manage to
keep losses to less than 10 per cent, he can keep 40 per cent
of the value of power saved. This generates powerful incentive
for him to reduce line losses. In the way the Chinese collect
metered electricity charges, it is well nigh impossible to make
financial losses since these are firmly passed on downstream from
one level to the next. Take for example, the malpractice common
in south Asia of end-users tampering with meters or bribing the
meter-reader to under-report actual consumption. In the Chinese
system, it is very unlikely that such mal-practices can occur on
a large scale since the village electrician is faced with serious
personal loss if he fails to collect from the farmers electricity
charges for at least 90 per cent of power consumed as reported
at the transformer meter. And since malpractice by a farmer
directly hits other farmers in the village, there likely exist some
peer control over such practices. In making metered power pricing
work, China’s unique advantage is its strong village level au-
thority structure. The village committee, and especially, the
village party leader, are respected and feared. These ensure that
the electrician is able to do her job. In comparison to China’s
village committees, India’s village panchayats are utterly devoid
of power as well as authority as institutions for local governance.
In India, similar experiment is being tried out in Orissa where
private companies in charge of distribution first experimented
with Village Vidyut Sangha’s (Electricity Cooperatives) but are
now veering around to private entrepreneurs as electricity retail-
ers. However, we do not have evidence on how well this arrange-
ment is working. Even as India is taking small steps in the
direction of private electricity retailing,7 China is turning full
circle. In its third phase of modernising the electricity sector,
electricity plants, transmission and distribution infrastructure are
all now turned over to county electricity bureaus which have the
responsibility of O and M of the infrastructure, of electricity
delivery to households and other users, and of collecting user
charges. Thus China is moving to a system similar to India’s
where state electricity boards (SEBs) directly serve hundreds of
thousands of customers and collect user charges through their
own field force. Expectedly, China will begin to face much the
same problems in user fee recovery that Indian SEBs are trying
hard to wriggle out of.
In many Chinese provinces, County Electricity Companies are
therefore trying new ways of reducing transaction costs of collecting
user fees for rural customers, especially irrigators. One of these
is promoting pre-paid electricity cards or the IC card technology.
The IC card system combines computer management, inter-
active card and single-chip auto control technologies. Its key
benefit is that users need to pay electricity fee in advance to get
their cards ‘recharged’; moreover, IC cards can also be used for
auto-irrigation and to record irrigation time. When the money
stored in the card is used up, irrigation pump is switched off
automatically. In recent years, the IC card system for the irrigation
tube wells has been introduced in many water short provinces,
such as Shandong, Hebei, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Inner
Mongolia, Henan, Shaanxi, Jiangsu and Gansu.
A study commissioned by the IWMI-Tata Programme to un-
derstand how the IC card system is working in Lioning found
that the main driver of the technology is the difficulty that
township electricity companies and/or village committees faced
in collecting electricity dues from farmers [Wang et al 2004].
The study also found that Chinese farmers are as resistant to the
IC card system as south Asian farmers are to metering; and this
resistance is not reduced by the fact that the County Electricity
Companies and Village Committees invest Y 800/tube well plus
Y 2000/village on a computer/reading machine. Farmer resis-
tance is understandable. According to Wang et al (2003), agri-
cultural electricity bureau of Xinchengzi Region in Liaoning
province could not collect electricity fees of about 2 to 4 million
yuan/year from farmers before the IC cards were introduced; now,
farmers have lost this hidden subsidy.
The IC card system keeps the county electricity company happy,
because it eliminates all hidden subsidy. It keeps village commit-
tees happy because they are spared the hassle of collecting user
fee from reluctant farmers. We would however expect farmers
to be unhappy because of the new discipline to which they have
to submit under the IC card system; but the Wang et al (2004)
study concludes the majority of farmers interviewed to be happy
because IC card system is ‘fair’, it reduces inter-farmer conflict
on irrigation, and above all it drastically reduces the use of
electricity and water, and thereby irrigation cost. As one farmer
mentioned, “I save water, because now I see how much it costs”.
V
Direct Regulation and Water Demand
Management
Throughout south Asia, like in the north China plains (NCP),
pockets where groundwater draft is exceeding long-term recharge
are increasing by the day. Indian response to the challenge of
sustainable groundwater management is however still muted.
Political leaders still view groundwater as a resource that needs
intensive development. Groundwater professionals realise the
need for applying brakes in growing pockets of resource over-
exploitation and keep exhorting the need for strong legislation
and regulatory frameworks. Many policy researchers, including
the IWMI-Tata researchers, however, believe the case for direct
regulation hopeless in south Asian settings, not because it is
unnecessary or undesirable but on the grounds of administrative
feasibility and costs. They argue that direct regulation of ground-
water withdrawal would be well nigh impossible to enforce on 20
odd million pump owners, a number that is growing at a rate of
0.8-1 million/year [Shah 2003], scattered across a vast countryside.
The Indian experience with direct regulation so far has justified
this pessimism [Shah 2004; Moench, Burke and Moench 2002;
Phansalkar 2002].
However, under comparable conditions, China’s experience
with direct management, even if not entirely positive, has at
least shown some positive signs. Different provinces in the NCP
have tried different combinations of instruments for direct demand
management including: (a) tube well permits; (b) withdrawal
permits; (c) differential and penal pricing; (d) direct regulation
and sealing of wells; (e) creating alternative water supply; and
(f) promotion of water saving technologies. The experience has
been mixed; in general, these strategies have worked better on
industries than on farmers, and in richer eastern provinces than
in poorer western ones.
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Tube well permits do not control total groundwater draft but
do act as a check on tube well numbers especially in over-
exploited areas. Withdrawal permits are the most important direct
management intervention and entail the registration of each user,
allocation of quota to him/her, levy of a water resource fee, and
the monitoring actual use vis-à-vis allocation much like a system
that Mexico is experimenting without much success [Shah, Scott,
and Buecheler 2004]. Water bureaus in some groundwater stressed
regions at different administrative levels began experimenting
with withdrawal permits as far back as in 1970s but without
broader legislative support. However, real impetus came only
with a 1993 regulation on ‘Implementation Method of Water
Withdrawal Permit System’, under which any organisation or
individual who draws water from a river, lake or groundwater
over certain levels must apply for a water withdrawal permit from
the water resource bureaus (WRBs) at various government levels.
The legal and policy support gained further strength more recently
with the Water Law of 2002 which requires that old as well as new
tube wells get withdrawal permits by paying an annual withdrawal
fee [Wang and Huang 2002]. Doing this is a Herculean tasks;
and major successes are claimed. Wang and Huang (2002) for
example cite a 1995 Report on Implementation Situation of
Water Withdrawal Permit System by the ministry of water re-
sources which asserts that 95 per cent of users had applied for
withdrawal permits by July 1995. According to many observers,
this is unlikely to be true even in 2002. In our discussion with
Xingtai Water Bureau officials, of the 80,000 tube wells in use
in the Hebei prefecture, only 30,000 permits had been issued
so far. The same was the case in Liaoning, Henan, Shaanxi
and Jiangsu.
Another problem in the utility of withdrawal permits is the
collection of withdrawal fees from farmers. In the 1993 Regu-
lation farmers were specifically exempted from the fee for a
period of five years by the central government to alleviate their
burden; and the exemption continues to date. Every once in a
while, one comes across an interesting experiment at regulation
such as the use of IC cards installed on each tube well such
that it automatically shuts off once its allocated quota is pumped
out, as we saw in Shaanxi. However, the general picture is that
tube well as well as withdrawal permits have not brought any
significant regulation of groundwater demand for irrigation.
Wang and Huang (2002) suggested that water bureaus in Hebei
were to begin collecting water fees from farmers irrigating with
groundwater in 2000; however, in course of our fieldwork in
Hebei in mid-2002 and again in 2003, we found no sign of farmers
paying any water withdrawal fee in Hebei. Moreover, since most
tube wells are owned and operated by village committees, permits
are issued to them at a rate of 1 per village rather than per tube
well. Similar was our experience in Liaoning which instituted
Withdrawal Permits way back in 1978 and imposed a Water
Resource Fee in 1987. Both these were enforced on industrial
users and water companies even before the 1988 National Water
Law gave a legal basis in support of such regulation; however,
it is yet to touch agricultural use of groundwater.
Shaanxi has passed a slew of new water regulations in a quick
succession: Water Pollution Control Regulation (1998); Flooding
Control Regulation (1999); River Canal Management Regulation
(2000); Urban Water Source Protection Regulation (2001); Water
Saving Management Regulation (2003). These regulations are
acquiring teeth because more and more water use is getting
mediated; and institutions – water companies, irrigation districts,
VCs – respond to regulations more quickly and readily than
individual users. Through out north China, then, direct regulation
is pursued vigorously with those segments of users who are easy
to identify and regulate. For example, of the total of 23,800
permits issued by water bureaus in Shaanxi, over 10,000 are to
industrial users, irrigation districts and water supply companies
supplying domestic and industrial customers. Where irrigation
tube wells are operated by VCs, tube well permits are issued to
them; but where they are individually owned, the picture is hazy
and uncertain. With the segment of large users in the formal
‘organised’ sector, water budgeting too is done on an annual basis
with a further set of deterrents as in the province of Jiangsu. Here,
at the start of each year, water indents are called for from bulk
water users by the provincial water bureau. The total demand
is compared with supply and quotas are assigned. These are
monitored at the end of the year; and users exceeding the quotas
are penalised with a lower quota in subsequent year. Like Jiangsu,
Shaanxi too distinguishes between water resource fee and water
service fee but at woefully low rates of Y 0.03-0.06/m3 for surface
water, Y0.08/m3 for groundwater and Y 0.20/m3 for spring water
used by industry. Only industry is subjected to a water resource
fee. Come 2005 and, we were told by WRB officials, the fee
is being raised 10 times.
The experience of Shaanxi as well as Liaoning and Jiangsu
suggests that the emergence of mediating agencies and bulk
users makes direct regulation easier; it is easier to enforce
withdrawal permits and levy resource fee on ‘managed water’
than self-produced water; and that pricing also works more easily
with institutional users and ‘managed’ water. In Liaoning, for
example, levying differential water resource fees for groundwater
at Y 0.55/m3 in saline intrusion areas as compared to 0.3 Y/m3
in normal regions has begun to reduce groundwater extraction in
saline intrusion areas. Some industries have improved water use
efficiency; others have closed down. And the bureau has used
resources generated to bring surface water to increase ground-
water recharge in coastal aquifers with some success.
VI
Indirect Approaches to Demand Management
Groundwater demand for irrigation in some parts of rural north
China is facing downward pressure because of unrelated wider
trends which have no bearing on programmes and strategies
evolved by water administration. A major factor has been the
global decline in rice prices which in recent years have drastically
reduced profitability of rice cultivation. In Liaoning province,
as a result, farmers have begun shifting whole sale from irrigated
rice to rain fed maize. Especially in rice areas, falling rice price
have combined with rising costs of energy in pumping ground-
water from deep tube wells to form a pincer that is driving tube
well irrigated rice out of the market. According to Liaoning
Provincial Water Bureau officials we met, this pincer – besides
controls on industrial use of groundwater – has helped raise
average depth to the water table from 34 m to 18 m in the province.
This became clear to us in our visit to Youtai village, near the
city of Shenyang in Liaoning. This village like others in the region
has only 1 crop of rainfed maize in a year, planted in May and
harvested in October. After that the climate is too cold for
farming. Rainfed maize and irrigated rice are the alternatives from
which farmers choose. And rain fed maize is becoming increas-
ingly popular. Maize yields at 800 kg/mu are higher than irrigated
rice at 600 kg/mu. The prevailing farm gate price of both are
similar at Y 1.1/kg. But rice is far more input intensive – especially
in fertiliser, water and labour. Wage rates are Y 30/day. A hectare
(=15 mu) of rice requires 400-500 hours of pump irrigation. As
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Table 2: Water Pricing in Jiangsu
User Category Water Resource Water  Supply Cost
Fee (Y/m3) (Y/m3)
Groundwater pumpers 2 0
Domestic customers 0.03 0.04
Industrial 0.03 Supply cost + 5-10 per cent margin
Irrigation 0 Y 5-12/mu for rice
Y 0.6-3/mu wheat
a result, input costs of irrigated rice may be as high as Y 500-
600/mu. Not surprising that of the 5,096 mu of farm land in this
village, only 1,000 mu are under rice; 3 years ago, the proportions
were the opposite of this.
In Hebei, Bt cotton is increasingly replacing maize-wheat
combination that has prevailed during recent years in many areas;
and the Chinese government is proactively encouraging this shift,
only partly because Bt cotton uses far less water compared to
the maize-wheat combination. For one, land planted with Bt
cotton remains fallow the rest of the year in many areas. Then,
Bt cotton needs only one, at most two irrigations; whereas wheat
needs at least 4-6 irrigations although maize is mostly rainfed.
Above all, cotton is not only amenable to drip irrigation but has
a strong positive yield response. As a result, we found large areas
of Bt cotton farmers in Hebei and Shandong taking to drip
irrigation to save pumping costs and raise crop yield. There is also
massive adoption of plastic mulch as a device to reduce evapo-
ration of water and moisture preservation in Hebei and Shandong
provinces. Farmers we met claimed large electricity cost savings
and significant yield gains. That there are significant yield gains
from mulching seems also indicated by the fact that farmers spend
Y 25-30/mu to lay mulch, and that local shops stock polythene
mulching material is indication that demand is mainstreamed.
Near Feixiang on the border of Shandong province, we found
extensive use of plastic mulching in even rain fed Bt cotton. The
woman farmer we interviewed planted Bt cotton only if there
is rain. But for the past 2-3 years, she has begun using plastic
mulch at a cost of Y 20-25/mu which helps to greatly improve
the root zone moisture regime and improve crop yields.
Bt cotton seems extremely profitable with gross income at
Y 1,300-1,500/mu and input costs at Y 300/mu. This makes it
attractive to farmers. And because it saves groundwater,
intervening around it has become popular with VCs and WRBs
in groundwater stressed areas. In Dagao village in Nangong
county (Xingtai prefecture, Hebei), the key problem is salinity
in shallow aquifers and water tables falling @ 1 m/year. Several
micro-irrigation projects are established here. In one such that
we visited, of the 3,500 mu of irrigated area, 1,000 were under
Bt cotton, and over 50 per cent of Bt cotton mu were under drip
irrigation installed by the VC from its own funds. Some 80 old
shallow tube wells (5 KV), privately owned, are now in use only
for supplementary irrigation. In 1995, 9 new Deep TWs (30 KV)
were installed by the VC at a cost of Y 1,20,000 (Y 70,000 for
Deep TWs and Y 50,000 for buried pipes) each commanding
300 mu. Farmers asserted great advantage of drip irrigation.
Earlier, irrigating all the 500 mu took the VC 1 month; now it is
done in 1 week. Water use has fallen from 50m3/mu to 20 m3/mu.
Electricity cost of pumping is down from Y 25/mu to Y 7/mu.
And cotton yield has increased, according to farmers interviewed,
from 150 kg/mu to 225 kg/mu. Enthused by the results, the VC
is planning to cover all 3,500 mu under drip irrigation, which
essentially is ‘strip irrigation’ since no micro-tubes are used.
Before the drip system was installed, it took 1.5 hours to irrigate
a distant mu; now, 1 hour’s pumping irrigates 4 mu.
Promoting the shift from wheat-maize combine to Bt cotton,
promoting drip irrigation and mulching in Bt cotton aided by
high and rising costs of electricity – all these are emerging as
indirect instruments of controlling groundwater demand in north
China plains.
VII
Arresting Urban Groundwater Depletion
Like elsewhere in Asia, Chinese cities are facing unprecedented
groundwater stress. The strategy many Chinese provinces find
effective to control urban groundwater depletion is three-pronged:
(a) import surface water from distant sources and use it to crowd
out urban tube wells; (b) as alternate sources become available,
seal urban tube wells in a campaign mode; (c) begin to enforce
withdrawal permits strictly once alternative water becomes
available; and (d) use a penal water resource fee on groundwater
to reflect the scarcity value of groundwater and promote sub-
stitution of surface water for groundwater.
Much evidence in Chinese cities suggests that depletion of
urban aquifers is best countered not by demand management,
which certainly plays a role, but by crowding out urban tube wells
through water imports. Shaanxi as well as Jiangsu offer good
examples of how such a strategy works. Until 1990, urban tube
wells supplied 8,00,000 m3/day to urban population resulting in
serious depletion of Shaanxi’s urban aquifers. Now, surface water
imports supply 1.2 million m3/day. All urban tube wells are closed
and, according the officials of Shaanxi Water Resource Bureau,
water tables are now rising @ 1-1.5 m/year. All new urban water
supply projects are based on surface water imports. Xian, the
capital city, gets its water from a reservoir 40 km away.
Jiangsu, next only to Shanghai and Guangdong in industrial
progress and per caput income, has experienced intensive ground-
water use in the industrial and domestic sectors in large part
because its use carried no or very low fees. As a result, in many
urban areas, groundwater tables had fallen to 40 m or more;
and tube wells were typically 80 or more meters deep. To ease
the pressure on groundwater, the province implemented a
south-to-north water transfer project of its own within the prov-
ince using lifted Yangtze water. This water is priced according
to a different formula; since the water has to be lifted to a
considerable height at five different places, there is a significant
fixed as well as variable water supply cost. To reflect this, the
water price too has a flat (basic price) and variable component
(volumetric, based on metered use).
Having created a new supply source, the province began
enforcing water permits and put into place a two-part pricing
formula providing for a water resource fee and a water supply
fee (Table 2). In this new formula, groundwater is priced way
above even lifted Yangze water at Y 2/ m3; as a result, industries
as well as water companies have begun substituting surface water
for groundwater. All non-irrigation tube wells are metered. Each
groundwater user (non-irrigation) is issued a withdrawal permit,
accompanied by a card which records the complete tube well
profile as well as pattern of pumping and use of groundwater.
A total of 4,830 tube wells have been so covered by the formal
regulatory system in three cities of the province. Along side, the
WRB has also launched an intensive water saving programme;
some 1,000 industries are involved in experimenting innovative
water saving technologies.
As a result of this extensive direct regulation, since 1995, the
province has made a big impact on reducing urban groundwater
depletion. From 2001, Jiangsu Provincial WRB has begun a
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campaign to close urban and industrial tube wells; 3,100 tube
wells have already been closed; and the WRB target is to close
all tube wells by 2005. Not surprising then that groundwater
depletion has not only been arrested but water tables in many
urban areas have begun rising by up to 6 m/year. Jiangsu’s
experience suggests that where alternatives are available and
dependence on groundwater is low, proactive demand manage-
ment not only becomes feasible but quite easy.
VIII
Size and Penetration of Water Bureaucracy
One reason why China has aggressively pursued direct man-
agement in water resources sector is its huge, 6-layered water
bureaucracy presided at the top by the ministry of water resources.
The real operating agencies are however parts of the hierarchy
of water bureaus at provincial, prefecture, county and township
levels which generally constitute the operational arms of water
administration within the various provinces. India is notorious
for its bloated bureaucracy; but the Chinese employ far more
bureaucrats in managing water resources. Hebei is a case in point.
Xingtai prefecture, one of Hebei’s 11, alone has a total of 20,000
employees in water resource bureaus and other water organisations
in the prefecture. In Liaoning province, some 40,000 government
staff are employed in water bureaus at different levels, excluding
an equal number at village level. Gujarat is bigger than Liaoning,
but has just around 11,000 public officials employed by water
related departments; most of these are engineers hired for con-
struction of projects; very few public officials are devoted directly
to water resources and service management at the district level
and below; and this size too is shrinking.
In China, water bureaus are substantial outfits even at the
county level (equivalent to 2-3 taluks/blocks/tehsils in south
Asia). In Ci county in Hebei province, which has 19 townships
and 390 villages under it, the county water bureau staff is only
60 and a typical township water bureau employs 20-30 officials;
however the entire hierarchy of water bureaus in Ci county
employs some 560 people. Hebei province, for instance, has nine
city level water bureaus and 200 water bureaus of counties like
Ci which manage water resources in 4,000 small townships and
villages. Thus, when all levels are taken together, the water bureau
structure in a province may employ several tens of thousand
officials; and these do not include village and some of the
township level water officials who are paid wholly from local
taxes and water fees. Whereas the provincial water bureau is fully
supported by the state budget, the county water bureau has to
raise a portion of its own budget and the township water bureau
and village water administration is wholly self-financed. Thus,
Ci county in Hebei has an annual budget of Y 30 million; of
this, in 2002, Y 10 million was contributed by the national
government under drought mitigation programme but the balance
of Y 20 million had to be raised from farmers’ taxes and local
incomes. Kendy et al (2002) note, in their study of groundwater
institutions and policies in Luancheng county near Beijing that
“fee revenues are sufficient to fund the County Water Affairs
Bureau, but not to finance water conservation countywide”.
Having a large bureaucracy with deep penetration and presence
at local and meso levels has its pros as well as cons. The Chinese
bureaucracy has been a subject of much criticism. However, the
powerful role it can play in the governance of scarce natural
resources such as water is often underestimated. In India, the
Supreme Court announced two far-reaching environmental
decisions during the past decade: first, it enjoined the forest
department to halt illegal felling of trees in reserved forest areas
forthwith; and the forest department effectively implemented the
Supreme Court’s injunction throughout Indian countryside because
it has a large field force with significant presence at the local
levels. In 1996, the same Supreme Court designated the Central
Groundwater Board of India as the nation’s Groundwater Autho-
rity and mandated it to control groundwater over-draft forthwith.
Six years later, the Central Groundwater Authority has remained
totally ineffective to implement the Supreme Court mandate
mainly because it has no field force worth the name.
India has got so disillusioned with its bureaucracy that all its
energy is focused on shrinking it rather than vitalising it.8  Irrigation
departments of most Indian states have recruited professional
engineers only for constructing irrigation systems; now that the
construction phase is over, these have failed to transform their
professional workforce for resource management and service
provision roles. As a result, irrigation bureaucracy is increasingly
being viewed as a drag on the public exchequer; and many states
have not recruited professional staff in irrigation departments for
the past 12-15 years; and according to one analysis, Gujarat’s
irrigation department will shrink from a total strength of 11,000
engineers to less than 500 by 2010 because those who super-
annuate are not replaced. At the same time, we find that the
government’s presence in water management role at district,
taluka and village level is either very thin or absent. China’s focus
on transforming bureaucrats into entrepreneurs is of relevance
to India because the role of the state will have to grow – not
shrink – as the stress on water resources grows further. For, leave
alone direct regulation, even indirect instruments of water
management require a bureaucracy to implement.
IX
Institutional Reform
Compared to south Asia’s fragmented water administrations,
China’s water affairs bureaus represent an effective first step
towards integrating and unifying water management tasks at local
levels. Until a decade ago, water management in a typical county
in China was fragmented as in a south Asian local administrative
territory (such as a tehsil or a district). Before then, water supply
and sanitation and infrastructure construction was managed by
the urban construction bureau; water companies were controlled
by urban management department. Groundwater was under the
ministry of geology and mines. And water saving technologies
were the responsibility of the ministry of agriculture while power
plants and electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure
in many provinces were owned and managed by water bureaus.
A serious – and avoidable – water crisis in Shenzhen in 1991
led its municipal administration to create a water affairs bureau
which integrated all tasks and functions concerned with water
source development and construction, flood control and drainage
infrastructure, urban water supply and sanitation, water saving
programmes – all under one umbrella. The water affairs bureau
model caught on like wildfire; and by May 1999, 160 counties
had reorganised water resource bureaus into water affairs  bureaus.
In May 2000, Shanghai brought in even more functions under
a new Shanghai Water Affairs Bureau [Wang and Huang 2002].
From the groundwater perspective, another major 1998 reform
was to remove groundwater management from the ministry of
geology and mines to the ministry of water resources, a more
logical home.
We heard the echo of this bottom-up institutional reform
backed by top level legislative action (2002 Water Law) wherever
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we went. In Shaanxi, converting erstwhile water resource bureaus
into water affairs bureaus has been done in a campaign mode.
Until recently, urban water supply was managed by urban con-
struction bureaus. Now there is a growing movement to shift this
to water affairs bureau. Of the 100 County WRBs in Shaanxi,
seven have already transformed into WABs. In Liaoning, too,
11 counties and four cities have already converted to water affairs
bureaus since 1997. All 11 counties in Xingtai prefecture in Hebei
province have converted into water affairs bureau’s which manage
water companies; only Xingtai city’s water supply is managed
by a company owned by urban construction bureau.
In Jiangsu, we found transition to the water affairs bureau
structure was progressing at different pace in different parts of
the province. Suzhou city, for instance, has a WAB that integrates
all key water management roles: water supply, issue and enforce-
ment of withdrawal permits, collecting pollution fees, water
resource fees, all under one roof. Elsewhere in the province, the
restructuring is still in progress. Despite this uneven pace of
reform, Chinese researchers believe that unified water resources
management under the overall leadership of the much-restruc-
tured MoWR is gradually becoming a reality in China [Wang
and Huang 2002].
Increasingly, water affairs bureaus are strongly encouraged to
adopt a business rather than regulatory-bureaucratic approach and
generate resources locally by selling services. True, this may be
easier said than done, especially since revenue yielding water
infrastructural assets are often still held by provincial bureaus
or the national government. Hebei, for example, has two large
reservoirs which might yield substantial income from water sale
to industries and municipalities; however, these are under the
direct control of the national government. In Ci County Water
Bureau in Hebei, the new drive towards local resource generation
is already beginning to change the culture of the bureau. The
River Basin Management office made Y 2 million last year by
selling irrigation to farmers @ Y 10/ 1000 m3 of Zhuang River
water to irrigate 60,000 mu. Ci county water affairs bureau also
has a separate company to manage urban and industrial water
supply from groundwater. Industries either get water from the
company or obtain a licence and make their own tube wells by
paying the water resource fee. These are closely monitored and
closed if the resource position is inadequate.
Conclusion
In this article, we have suggested that China is refreshingly
unorthodox in exploring unique solutions to its context which,
in several respects, is more similar to south Asia’s than of the
industrialised west where south Asia tends to look for solutions.
It is by no means our contention that approaches China is trying
are necessarily appropriate for other countries or even that they
will solve China’s problems. We are also not suggesting that
China’s performance on Integrated Water Resources Manage-
ment is about to meet international standards. In fact, a UN Expert
Committee studying Huiahe basin wrote in 2000 that, “Water
use and abuse in the Huaihe basin is effectively anarchic with
very limited enforcement and compliance” [UN 2000]. However,
we do suggest that south Asian discussions on water reforms
need to incorporate a wider body of experience; as such, Chinese
explorations appear one appropriate candidate. From examining
the Chinese experience, three sets of conclusions can be drawn
with direct relevance to south Asia.
First, China has already given up on traditional communitarian
model of organisation for managing its small scale groundwater
based irrigation systems as well as large irrigation projects.
Instead of participatory management by water users’ associations
– except on World Bank funded PIM projects – China has
experimented with a variety of models of ‘irrigation service
providers’ who are incentivised for better service delivery,
improved water use efficiency and better performance in water
fee collection. It is not clear yet how well this arrangement is
performing; in the case of small scale systems, it is certainly
promoting financial sustainability; in large systems, indications
are that incentivised service providers promote efficient water
use, besides improving fee collection.
Second, north China’s agrarian economy is as precariously
dependent upon high energy use in pumping groundwater as
south Asia’s is. However, the huge transaction costs of metering
a large number of scattered tubewells has forced south Asia to
adopt flat electricity pricing which is more prone to subsidisation,
while China, in a similar situation, has struggled to make metered
electricity supply and full cost recovery work in agricultural
power supply. This has not been easy; but significant gains seem
to have been achieved by incentivising village electricians to
operate as commission agents of the township electricity bureau.
More recently, many Chinese provinces have been experimenting
with EC pre-paid electricity cards for agricultural electricity
supply. Many Indian states – where subsidised flat electricity
tariff is wrecking groundwater as well as power industries – are
struggling to reintroduce metering. China’s experience can provide
useful guidance in this direction.
Third, north China has made quite some progress in getting
some modicum of control over runaway groundwater over draft
by using a combination of direct as well as indirect instruments
of demand management such as promotion of water saving
approaches and technologies, implementation of withdrawal per-
mits, pricing of water resource as well as services, enforcement
of water withdrawal quotas, crowding out urban tube wells by
surface water imports and such like. Doubtless, these measures
have been more effective in urban areas than in agriculture, and
in economically more dynamic eastern provinces compared to
agricultural western provinces. However, after years of regulatory
activism there is growing confidence amongst Chinese water
professionals that they can achieve their own version of IWRM
which, at the ground level, means (a) bringing all water man-
agement roles under water resource bureau structures; (b) broad-
ening water resource bureau roles by rechristening them as water
affairs bureaus; (c) instituting a system of water withdrawal
permits; (d) imposing and levying a water resource fee in addition
to water service charges; (e) countering urban groundwater deple-
tion through import of surface water from distant projects; and
(f) by reorienting its massive water bureaucracy from water
development to resource management mode rather than by
shrinking it.
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Notes
[The authors gratefully acknowledge comments on an earlier draft by FAO’s
Jacob Burke, IWMI’s Hugh Turral and USDA’s Brian Lohmar.]
1 Going to the depth of 350 metres or so, motor-pumps generally of 28 kW
and 1,000-1,500 metres of buried pipeline network – all of which comprises
a tubewell assembly may entail an investment of Y 250-300 thousand
(US $ 30-38,000) apiece.
2 However, in some new drip and sprinkler irrigation systems established
with support from National Water Saving Programme, water meters are

Economic and Political Weekly July 31, 2004 3461
installed on the main distribution line as well as on each plot; and
contractors levy fee per m3 of water supplied.
3 “In most cases (70 per cent of WUAs), the governing board was the village
leadership itself. In minority share of cases, village leaders appointed a
chair or manager to carry out the day-to-day duties of the WUAs. In many
of the WUAs that had village appointed leaders, however, the manager
actually had close ties to the village leadership, more than half being a
leader in an earlier time period. In other words, at least in terms of the
composition of the management team, most WUAs differ little from
collective management” [Wang et al 2003]. In a study of PIM in Zhanghe
and Dongfeng Irrigation Districts of Hubei province, Zhang and Dinghuan
(2003) concluded that in 70 per cent of the WUAs, water fee collection
is still done by VCs; that 81.3 per cent of WUAs have village leaders
as chairmen and that 84 per cent of the households were not involved
in electing the WUA chairman.
4 Water purchased from 5 hp diesel pump with an hourly discharge of 12,000
litres costs Rs 50 in most parts of eastern India.
5 Although the network reform programme is a national government
programme, the government contributes only a part of the resources, the
balance being contributed by the village committees. Just to give an
example, Guantun village in Yanjin country of Henan got a grant of Y
60,000 under this project for power infrastructure rehabilitation. To match
this, the village contributed Y 60,000, too; of this 60 per cent came from
the funds from the village collective; and the remaining 40 per cent were
raised as farmer contributions by charging Y 80/person. All the power
lines and other infrastructure was rehabilitated during recent years under
this national programme. New meters were purchased by the township
in bulk and installed in users’ homes on a cost recovery basis. A system
of monitoring meters was installed too.
6 The village electrician’s reward system encourages him to exert pressures
to achieve greater efficiency by cutting line losses. In Dong Wang Nnu
village in Ci county, in Hebei province, the village committee’s single
large transformer which served both domestic and agricultural connections
caused heavy line losses at 22-25 per cent. Once the Network Reform
Programme began, the electrician pressurised the VC to sell the old
transformer to the County Electricity Bureau and raise Y 10,000 (partly
by collecting a levy of Y 25/family and partly by a contribution from
the village development fund) to get two new transformers, one for
domestic connections and the other for pumps. Since then, power losses
have fallen to the permissible 12 per cent here.
7 A recent study of privatisation of electricity retailing in rural Orissa
commissioned by the IWMI-Tata programme, it seems things are moving
fast. Village vidyut sanghas energetically promoted in over 5,000 of
villages seem to have proved unequal to the task of billing and collecting
electricity charges. To retrieve the situation, three private franchisees were
appointed on terms comparable to the Chinese village electricians. However,
unlike the Chinese village electrician, each of these large franchisees
undertake billing, metering and collection for hundreds of villages
through their employees and agents [Mishra 2004]. As in China, here too,
results are encouraging; bill collection has improved rapidly; consumer
complaints are addressed swiftly; a new line of communication has opened
up between the utility and its consumers. The lessons are important;
however, before making a final conclusion, Orissa approach needs to be
tried in states where electricity use in agriculture is high, which it is not
in Orissa.
8 To be sure, as part of its transition from a planned to a market economy,
China too is restructuring government to streamline and reduce its staff.
However, indications are that many restructured agencies will be under
pressure to generate resources through service provision, and ‘increase
efficiency and effectiveness by focusing on the core tasks’ [UN 2000].
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